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COMMENT
ENJOINING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS WHICH
INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
The need to avoid friction and to preserve the integrity of the state
judiciary has led to limitations on the federal power to enjoin proceedings in state courts.' These limitations are presently embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1964):
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.2
Interpretation of section 2283 was at issue in the recent case of NLRB
v. Schertzer.' The National Labor Relations Board had ordered an
employer to pay back wages to an employee in settlement of an unfair
labor practice dispute. 4 After the Board issued its order, a creditor of
the employee instituted garnishment proceedings in state court and
named the employer as garnishee. Thereupon, the Board sought
enforcement of the back-pay order in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit--despite the employer's avowed willingness to comply
with the order 5 -and simultaneously petitioned that court for a stay
of the state proceedings. The Second Circuit held that it had the
power to grant the injunction-pursuant to section 2283-"in aid of
its jurisdiction" and to "protect and effectuate its judgments," ' and
that in view of the threat that the state garnishment posed to the
Board's administrative procedures, it would exercise its discretionary
power and grant the Board's petition.
The "in aid of jurisdiction" exception, the first ground relied upon
by the court in Schertzer, can be traced back to the Judiciary Act of
1793, which provided that no writs "of injunction [shall] be granted
' See, e.g., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
The injunction is directed against the plaintiff in the state court, and not against
the court itself. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 247 (2d
Cir. 1961), and cases cited therein.
2

2360 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1966).

The procedure for payment of the back-pay award
is for the employer to write a check to the employee and then to turn the check over
to the regional office of the NLRB for disbursement. KAmmHOLZ & McGuiNESS,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 75 (1962).
6 360 F.2d at 153.
I Ibid.; accord, NLRB v. Ozanne, Inc., 307 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1962) (per curiam);
NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1942).
4 154 N.L.R.B. 938 (1965).
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to stay proceedings in any court of a state." ' Although this section,
without substantial modification, remained in effect until the passage
of the Judicial Code in 1948,8 federal courts in the post-Civil War
period experienced difficulty with the inflexibility of the standard and
therefore carved exceptions.' The first such case was French v. Hay, °
where a Virginia plaintiff sued a Pennsylvania defendant in a Virginia
state court, alleging misappropriation of his property and demanding
damages and an accounting. The suit for an accounting was removed
to federal court before the state court had acted upon it, and a state
decree which awarded the plaintiff damages was vacated by the federal
court. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought an action in the Pennsylvania
state court upon the vacated judgment, and the federal court enjoined
the Pennsylvania court from holding further proceedings on the matter.
The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction, holding that "while the
jurisdiction [of the federal court] lasted it was exclusive, and could not
be trenched upon by any other tribunal." " The state action had this
effect because it would have deprived the federal court of the ability
to grant an effective remedy in that a federal decree in favor of the
defendant, without the stay, would leave him "in exactly the same
situation he would have been if those decrees had been against him." 12
Similarly, in Julian v. Central Trust Co.,"3 a federal court enjoined a
state court from levying upon property involved in a foreclosure proceeding in the federal court because the state action would have deprived the federal court of the ability to make whatever disposition of
the property it saw fit. 4 These exceptions are presently included
within the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception, 5 and thus, under that
7Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.
8 Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793 was codified in

REV. STAT.

§ 720 (1875).

At that time an exception was added to permit stays of state proceedings where the
action arose under federal bankruptcy laws. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118, 132-33 (1941). Later §720 was reenacted as §265 of the Judicial
Code of 1911. Act of March 3, 1911, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
9 Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunctions Against ProceedingsinState Courts: The
Life History of a Statute, 30 MicH. L. Rmv. 1145, 1149 (1932).
30 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874).
For other examples, see Looney v. Eastern
Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918); Riverdale Cotton Mills Co. v. Alabama & Ga.
Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188 (1905) ; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904) ;
Deitzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1880). For an excellent discussion of French
v. Hay, see Durfee & Sloss, supra note 9, at 1149-51.
11 French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 253 (1874).
2
Ibid.
13193 U.S. 93 (1904).
141d. at 112-14. The general rule under the pre-section 2283 anti-injunction
statutes was that "when a federal court has acquired jurisdiction, whether originally
or by removal, . . . it may enjoin proceedings in a state court for the incidental
purpose of making effective its 'prior jurisdiction . . . .'
Durfee & Sloss, supra
note 9, at 1151. It is doubtful whether this doctrine permitted a stay of the state
proceedings where the only objection was that the state court and the federal court
had concurrent in personam jurisdiction. See Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State
Court Proceedings,74 HARv. L. Rxv. 726, 731-32 (1961).
15 The Revisers' Notes to § 2283 indicate that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception was intended to include the removal exception. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
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clause, a federal court may enjoin state proceedings which frustrate
its ability to grant an appropriate remedy.
The leading case illustrating the application of the "inaid of
jurisdiction" exception is Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB.Y
In that
case, an employer filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board
and simultaneously petitioned a state court to enjoin a labor union from
picketing. The state court issued an injunction, and the NLRB petitioned the federal district court, pursuant to section 10(j) of the
National Labor Relations Act,' 7 to enjoin the picketing and to stay

the state injunction proceedings on the ground that the stay was necessary to preserve the federal court's jurisdiction over the injunction
proceedings. The district court granted the stay as necessary "in aid
of its jurisdiction," and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
district court must "have unfettered power to decide for or against the
union, and to write such decree as it deemed necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act .

.

.

.,

Thus the district court could stay the

state proceedings to free itself of the remedial restraints which the state
court had imposed.
In Schertzer, unlike CapitalService, there was no remedial conflict
between the state garnishment action and enforcement of the back-pay
award against the avowedly willing employer, and therefore the "in
aid of jurisdiction" exception employed by the court was inapposite.'
State garnishment does not release the employer from his economic
obligation and thereby permit him to retain the fruits of his unlawful
conduct, nor is the employee deprived of the compensation which the
Board and the court have awarded him. The employee will receive the
money or its value in any case, either by the extinguishment of an
existing debt or in cash, if upon final adjudication the state court finds
that the creditor does not have a valid claim. The only change in the
situation is of a purely technical nature, i.e., the back-pay award is made
subject to the creditor's remedies which would attach to any of the
Cong., 1st Sess. A 181-82 (1947); accord, Structural Steel & Forge Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 269 F.2d 714 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 886 (1959). The "in
rem" exception, exemplified by Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904),
was likewise included. Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957) (alternate holding).
16347 U.S. 501 (1954). In this case, as in Schertzer, the type of jurisdiction
under discussion is the subject-matter jurisdiction conferred by the NLRA.
1761 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
Section 10(j) provides, in
relevant part: "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . .
charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice,
to petition any United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order."
18 347 U.S. at 505-06.

19 The discussion assumes that the court of appeals will enforce the Board's order
since the employer did not contest the back-pay award. However, if for some reason
the court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order, obviously there is no longer
a debt subject to garnishment and therefore the impossibility of conflict between the
federal and state judiciaries is even clearer.
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employee's property in the state. ° In no sense can this change be
deemed to be of such magnitude as to deprive the federal court of
jurisdiction. Indeed, the whole issue is somewhat academic since not
even the Board contends that the creditor could not sue the employee
directly after he has received the money. Thus under the facts of
Schertzer, the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception cannot justify the
stay of the state garnishment proceedings.
The third exception to section 2283-to "protect or effectuate"
the judgments of a federal court-is directed to the specific problem of
state court relitigation of matters previously adjudicated by the federal
courts.2 Thus a state court may be enjoined from overturning a
federal judgment. This exception, despite the Second Circuit's invocation of the appropriate language, is inapplicable to Schertzer
because in that case the federal court had not yet rendered a judgment. 2
If the court meant only to protect judgments which it might choose to
render, the considerations are identical to those discussed above under
the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception.
Thus neither of the grounds given by the court justify the result
in Schertzer. Under section 2283, however, there is one additional
ground for granting a stay of state court proceedings-an express
congressional authorization. While the National Labor Relations Act
does not expressly authorize the district courts or the courts of appeals
to enjoin state proceedings, the absence of such language does not
necessarily mean that this exception is inapplicable.'
Prior to the
enactment of section 2283, many acts of Congress were interpreted by
the courts as implied authorizations for staying state proceedings,2 4 and
the express authorization exception, despite the obvious clarity of the
language, embodies these implied exceptions.'
For example, the
2o Generally speaking, it is one of the policies of the National Labor Relations Act . . . to require an employer to compensate employees in money
for any loss in wages suffered by them as a result of any one or more of the
defined unfair labor practices. It is the policy of Massachusetts, evidently,
to subject wages above a fixed minimum sum and subject to the safeguard
of judicial scrutiny, to the payment of a wage earner's just debts. . .. We
see no necessary collision between these policies nor have we heard any
cogent reason advanced by the Board why this Court should grant the relief
which it seeks to protect an alleged debtor-employee from the operation of
the state policy.
NLRB v. Underwood Machinery Co., 198 F.2d 93, 95 (1st Cir. 1952), overruled,
NLRB
v. Ozanne, Inc., 307 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
21
Reviser's Notes, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 181-82 (1947);
accord, Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1950).
22 360 F.2d at 153.
23
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516
(1955) (dictum).
24 See generally Comment, Injunction by Federal Court Against State Court
Interference With NLRB Back Pay Order, 52 YALE L.J. 150 (1942); Note, Federal
Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARv. L. REV. 726, 730-31 (1961).
2
'-Revisers' Notes, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 181-82 (1947);
accord, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514
(1955).
See generally Note, Incompatibility-the Touchstone of Section 2283;
Express Authorization Exception, 50 VA. L. REv. 1404, 1408-14 (1964),
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Frazier-Lemke Act of 1933 26 provided that once a farmer had filed
a bankruptcy petition in federal court, the farmer and his property shall
be subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction of the court," and that proceedings with respect to that adjudication shall not be maintained in any
other tribunal. There was no express provision for an injunction; 27
nonetheless, it is clear that the act operated as an implied exception.
As the Supreme Court stated in Kalb v. Feuerstein2 :

If Congress has vested in the bankruptcy courts exclusive
jurisdiction over farmer-debtors and their property, and . . .
withdrawn [it] from all other courts .

.

.

its Act is the

supreme law of the land which all courts-state and federalmust observe. The wisdom and desirability of an automatic
statutory ouster of jurisdiction

.

.

. were considerations

for Congress alone. 9
Similarly, the Shipowners Act of 1851 1 provides only that once a
shipowner deposits with the court a sum equal to the value of his
interest in the ship, "all claims and proceedings against the owner
with respect to the matter in question shall cease." This clause has
been held to authorize, by implication, a stay of state proceedings.3 '
Clearly the National Labor Relations Act does not present as
strong a case for finding an implied exception as do the above
statutes. The NLRA does not expressly prohibit proceedings in other
tribunals once the court of appeals has taken jurisdiction for enforcement 32 or review 3 of a Board order, or once the district court has
taken jurisdiction of a proceeding for a temporary injunction3 4 The
NLRA does provide, however, that only the federal district courts may
2647 Stat. 1473.
2 7
An express provision was later added. 49 Stat. 944 (1935), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 203(s) (2) (1958). Although there are no cases after the adoption of § 2283
in 1948, it would seem that the exception survived. Note, Incompatibility-the
Touchstone of Section 2283"s Express Authorization Exception, 50 VA. L. REv. 1404,
1409 (1964). See Revisers' Notes, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 181-82

(1947).

28308 U.S. 433 (1940).
2
91d. at 439 (dictum).
30 9 Stat. 635, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
31
Beal v. Waltz, 309 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1962).
32 Section 10(e), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964):
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the
United States . . . for the enforcement of such order . . . . Upon the
filing of such petition, the court . . . shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding . . . . [T]he jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive . ...
33 Section 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964):
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board . . . may obtain
a review of such order in any United States court of appeals . . . . Upon
the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in
the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e) of this section,
and shall have the same jurisdiction . . ..
34 Section 10(j), 61 Stat 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964). See note 17
supra.
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consider Board petitions for a temporary restraining order,35 and that
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals for review and enforcement
"shall be exclusive." " Thus preemption would seem to provide a
rational ground for implying an exception to the general rule of
section 2283.
7
In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.,

however, the Supreme Court rejected the position that preemption
impliedly authorized federal courts to enjoin state proceedings.3" In
Richman, an employer brought an action in state court to enjoin a
union from picketing, and neither he nor any other interested party
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The state court
enjoined the picketing despite the union's objection that, under the
NLRA, only the Board could seek such relief, and only in a federal
court. The union, therefore, with the Board filing a brief as amicus
curiae, brought an action in the district court to enjoin the state
proceedings, urging preemption. The district court refused to grant
the injunction, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, recognized that the real issue in the
case was not protection of the district court's jurisdiction but protection of the prospective jurisdiction of the Board.39 Nonetheless,
the Court held, in effect, that preemption as an implied authorization
for a stay of state proceedings was not the method Congress had prescribed for protecting the Board's jurisdiction.4 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the preemption argument was based on the
fallacious assumption that Congress intended to authorize injunctions
because the state courts could not adequately protect federal rights, and
that judicial history clearly demonstrated that state courts, subject to
review by the Supreme Court, were perfectly competent to vindicate
federal rights.4 1 This being so, a stay of state proceedings would
35 Ibid.

36 Section 10(e), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §160(e)
32 & 33 stpra.
37 348 U.S. 511 (1955).

(1964).

See notes

38Id. at 515; accord, T. Smith & Son v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1960);

H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905
(1952); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. William D. Baker Co., 100

F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
39 348 U.S. at 520.

40
1n Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), a case arising under the
Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld the
issuance of a stay of state proceedings on the ground that the EPCA preempted the
dispute that was being adjudicated in the state court. Bowles, however, seems distinguishable from Richmin because in Bowles a complaint was filed with the Price
Administrator who was thus able to impart jurisdiction to the federal district court
by petitioning for an injunction to restrain Mrs. Willingham from violating the
EPCA. Section 205(a), 56 Stat. 33 (1942).
Conversely, in Richman no charge
was ever filed with the Board, and therefore it was powerless to bring the dispute
before the federal courts. Had the Board in Richman been able to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, the Board could have secured the relief which the union
failed to obtain. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
41348 U.S. at 518.
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create the friction and discord which section 2283 was designed to
avoid without any concomitant benefit. Section 2283, therefore,
should be interpreted narrowly and "not [as] a statute . . . convey-

ing a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application." 4
In Richmxn, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that although the
preemption argument could not be used to protect the Board's jurisdiction, the Board could utilize the Capital Service technique. 8 That
is, where the Board can impart jurisdiction to a federal court under
either section 10(e) or section 10(j) of the NLRA, it may petition
that court for a stay of state proceedings on the ground that it is
necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction.'
The problem in
Richnan, however, was that the Board was unable to impart such
jurisdiction. No charge had been filed with the Board, and therefore
it was unable to initiate section 10(j) proceedings for a temporary
restraining order in the district court; similarly it could not
render an order and petition the court of appeals for enforcement as
provided by section 10(e). Therefore, the Court held that the state
proceedings could not be enjoined.
Thus the rule which emerges from Richnan is that neither the
Board nor a private party may obtain an injunction against state
proceedings on the ground that the NLRA preempts the dispute in
favor of the Board and the federal courts, but that the Board may
protect its jurisdiction only where it can impart jurisdiction to a
federal court and where the state proceeding threatens the jurisdiction
of that federal court. Without quarreling with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's finding of what Congress intended," it is apparent that the
Richman decision has two detrimental effects. First, in a limited
number of cases-such as Richman-a party to a labor dispute will be
able to circumvent the remedial procedures outlined in the NLRA.
If no charge is filed with the Board, neither the Board nor a private
party can protect the Board's prospective jurisdiction, and therefore,
if the state court refuses to recognize a defense based on preemptionpossibly because preemption, while existing, may not be that clear-the
state suit would have to run its course with the Supreme Court
ultimately deciding that the state court lacked jurisdiction. The whole
process could easily take a number of years and if, as in Richman, the
issue is the propriety of the state court's injunction against union
picketing, time rather than a judicial decree will have decided the
dispute.4 6 Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized this problem in Rich42
Id. at 515-16. It is interesting to note that two years later the Supreme Court
found an implied exception where the United States, as a party, sought an injunction.
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
-3 348 U.S. at 517.
44 Id. at 520.
45 See generally Kochery, Conflict of Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and Exchsive Federal Jurisdiction,4 BuFrALo L. REv. 269 (1955).
46 Cox & BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 100 (6th ed. 1965).
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man, but declared that "insofar as a penumbral region must remain
between state and federal authority . . .state litigation must, in view

of § 2283, be allowed to run its course .... " 47
The second major problem arising out of the Richman decision
is that it prescribes a technique for protecting the Board's jurisdiction
whereby the arguments and the court's analysis must be made in terms
of the federal court's jurisdiction. This approach distorts the issues
and makes clearly reasoned opinions nearly impossible. For example,
in Capital Service the problem was not that the state action frustrated
the district court's power to issue a temporary restraining order; the
real question was whether a party, having filed a charge with the
Board, could frustrate the Board's jurisdiction by bringing the case
before a state tribunal. The statement of the Supreme Court in
Capital Service that the district court must have "unfettered" power
to decide for or against the union is rather meaningless in that
the district court granted precisely the same remedy as the state
court; i.e., it enjoined the union picketing. Similarly, the issue that
should have been considered in Schertzer was whether the state
garnishment action so interfered with the Board's administrative procedures as effectively to frustrate the Board's jurisdiction over the
awarding of back pay in the unfair labor practice dispute before it.
Richman, however, by allowing a federal court to protect the Board's
jurisdiction only where that protection can be justified in terms of the
court's jurisdiction, led to an invocation of the "in aid of jurisdiction"
exception where it was obviously inappropriate, and to a complete
failure to justify adequately the injunction in terms of the Board's
jurisdiction. Thus, Schertzer is one of the clearest cases demonstrating
the distorting effects of Richman.
The deleterious effects of Richman demonstrate the need for an
amendment to the NLRA. The amendment must enable the Board
to seek an injunction against state proceedings which allegedly have
the effect of frustrating the Board's prospective jurisdiction, as in
Richman, or jurisdiction which the Board has already assumed, as in
Capital Service and Schertzer. The amendment might read as follows:
A district court, upon application by the National Labor
Relations Board, may restrain any party from instituting or
prosecuting any proceeding in any state court, where the
effect of that proceeding is the avoidance or frustration of
the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction under this
act. The filing of an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board shall not be a prerequisite to the application for the restraining order.
In relation to section 2283, this amendment would permit injunctions
to be granted as "expressly authorized by Act of Congress."
47 348 U.S. at 521.
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Had the above amendment been in effect at the time of the
Schertzer case, the lines of analysis would have been very different.
The Board would have brought suit in a district court to enjoin the
state proceedings, and the focus of the district court's inquiry-far
from examining a threat to its own jurisdiction-would have been
whether the state garnishment action so interfered with the Board's
administrative procedures as to frustrate the relief which the Board
would grant in the back-pay controversy. On the facts of Schertzer,
three arguments could be advanced as to interference with Board
procedures: compliance with the Board's order will be delayed until
the conclusion of the state action; the Board's fiduciary role in
enforcing back-pay awards would compel it to investigate and appraise
the claims of the various creditors; and the Board would be enmeshed
in controversy outside of the scope of the act.4"
However, even if the NLRA were amended as suggested above, a
district court should not issue an injunction in a case whose facts
were like those in Schertzer. The argument that state garnishment
would delay compliance with the Board's order is untenable in that
it assumes that "compliance" with the Board's order results only when
the amount of the award, in cash, is in the hands of the employee.
The employee is not a ward of the Board, entitled to special consideration, and the Board has no interest in the garnishment suit.
The Board's interest is satisfied when the employer gives up the
economic benefit of the money in question, in favor of the employee,
whether or not that sum immediately becomes subject to the claims of
creditors.
The second and third arguments of the Board, that it would be
compelled to investigate claims and to become enmeshed in controversies outside the scope of the NLRA, really reduce themselves to the
contention that the limited time and resources of the Board and its
personnel will be wasted on administrative necessities arising out of
the state garnishment action to the detriment of Board activities in
areas more vital to labor relations. Obviously, the Board will not
have to weigh conflicting creditor claims; it need only require that
the garnishor give the NLRB timely notice of the garnishment proceeding. Thereafter, a clerk will have to make a record of the
garnishment action, and months or years later, upon final adjudication
of the garnishment action, the back-pay award will have to be recorded
as paid. It cannot be denied that this procedure is somewhat of a
burden upon the Board's administrative processes. However, the
proper test for the issuance of an injunction against a state court is
not the administrative convenience of the Board. The test is whether
the administrative burdens are so great as to frustrate the Board's
48
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-6, NLRB v. Schertzer, 360 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1966);
cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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ability to make a back-pay award in a dispute before it. It is
inconceivable that the added demands on the Board's finances and
time would be of such magnitude as to frustrate the Board's remedial
processes. Considering the traditional attitude of noninterference with
state courts,4 9 the adverse effects of the remedy sought seem heavily
to outweigh the detriment to be avoided.
In conclusion, the Schertzer opinion cannot be justified under
either of the grounds upon which it relied. Moreover, Schertzer
demonstrates the distorting effect which Richman has had on cases
where the Board has sought to protect its jurisdiction by petitioning
the federal courts for an injunction against state proceeedings. By
amending the National Labor Relations Act, however, Congress can
remove this distortion and provide a basis for reasoned analysis in
this area of labor relations.
49 See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) ; Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941); Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock
Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1952) (per curiam).

